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Time-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459895
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013480739
How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; ii) the impact of regulation; and iii) how bank closures exacerbated the post-war bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480811
Both investors and borrowers are concerned about liquidity. Investors desire liquidity because they are uncertain about when they will want to eliminate their holding of a financial asset. Borrowers are concerned about liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to continue to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471328
This paper argues that the banking crises in the United States in the early 1930s were similar to the twin crises' -- banking and balance of payments crises -- which have occurred in developing countries in recent years. The downturn that began in 1929 undermined banks that had made risky loans...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469180
Why do governments bailout banking systems in distress? We argue that the government can efficiently provide liquidity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469552
We study a modification of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which the bank may hold a liquid asset, some depositors see sunspots that could lead them to run, and all depositors have incomplete information about the bank's ability to survive a run. The incomplete information means that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456621
We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528381
We analyze a variant of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking in which savers can use a bank to invest in a risky project operated by an entrepreneur. The savers can buy equity in the bank and save via deposits. The bank chooses to invest in a safe asset or to fund the entrepreneur. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458500
We analyze U.S. banks' asset exposure to a recent rise in the interest rates with implications for financial stability. The U.S. banking system's market value of assets is $2 trillion lower than suggested by their book value of assets accounting for loan portfolios held to maturity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247969