Showing 1 - 10 of 389
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458351
A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460026
We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating signal and several costly nondiscriminating ( money … dividend signaling. The central testable implication of the model is verified empirically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473160
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463109
types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because …. Second, voters can exploit the signalling behavior of politicians by precommitting to a higher threshold for signals received …. Raising the threshold discourages signalling effort by low quality politicians but encourages effort by high quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460825
based on the intrinsic value of their projects, but also on signaling payoffs, which depend on the public's assessment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585423
In this paper, we investigate incentive structures within partnerships. Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475660
This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478746
I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463558