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Bankers on Boards : Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability

Kroszner, Randall S. - 1999

consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in …. Consistent with high potential costs of active bank involvement, we find that bankers tend to be represented on the boards of … implications for the current bank regulatory reform debate, such as whether to permit banks to own equity in non-financial firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471465

Continuing Dangers of Disinformation in Corporate Accounting Reports

Kane, Edward J. - 2003

Insiders can artificially deflect the market prices of financial instruments from their full-information or inside value' by issuing deceptive accounting reports. Incentive support for disinformational activity comes through forms of compensation that allow corporate insiders to profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469064

Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide

González, Tanja Artiga - 2013

We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 218 companies accused of price fixing. These firms engage in evasive financial reporting strategies, including earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459775

The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation

Crocker, Keith J. - 2006

This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016

Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks : National Banks in the 1890s

Calomiris, Charles W. - 2014

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks. Bankers may abuse their control rights to give themselves excessive salaries, favored access to credit, or to take excessive risks that benefit themselves at the expense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458857

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity : The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Bebchuk, Lucian - 1999

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471856

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

Morck, Randall - 2010

Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462167

The Internal Governance of Firms

Acharya, Viral V. - 2009

We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463081

Innocents Abroad : The Hazards of International Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms

Perkins, Susan - 2008

The fundamental unit of production in microeconomics is the firm, and this mirrors reality in the United States and United Kingdom. But elsewhere, business groups can be the more important unit, for business strategy is often formulated at the business group level, not the firm level. In many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464733

Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing

Albuquerque, Rui - 2007

The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465401

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