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Textbook theory assumes that firm managers maximize the net present value of future cash flows. But when you ask them, real-world firm managers consistently say that they are maximizing something else entirely: earnings per share (EPS). Perhaps this is a mistake. No matter. We take firm managers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250143
Anticipated dividend tax changes, on the other hand, allow firms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage so as to … (accelerate) firms' dividend payments, which leads them to hold higher (lower) cash balances and, for capital constrained firms …In accordance with the traditional view of dividend taxation, new firms raise less equity and invest less the higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464789
their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares … in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relationship between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and … firm payout policy could reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating to low dividend paying firms or managers adapting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465368
increases with dividend income, controlling for total wealth, total portfolio returns, and other sources of income. In a sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466380
internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463081
In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468748
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471856
This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462083
We study the interplay between a "one person-one vote" political system and a "one share-one vote" corporate governance regime. The political system sets Pigouvian subsidies, while corporate governance determines firm-specific public good investments. Our analysis highlights a two-way feedback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576634
This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium, in a setting without takeovers and controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries to influence the composition of the shareholder base by accumulating votes and buying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014437023