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We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479596
This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial …, agency costs of equity (such as perquisite consumption) reduce the returns earned by acquirers. As the managerial stake in … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473808
costs exceed the benefits of brokers' knowledge and expertise. Thus, quantification of the net value of brokerage services … indicates that agency costs exceed the advantages of brokers' knowledge and expertise by a wide margin …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464850
managers improves the efficiency of the transmission of knowledge across countries. The model further delivers the prediction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466472
costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity … is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher … valuations support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462742
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465401
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465986
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469939
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents" who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the" primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472538
Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471259