This paper develops a method for option hedging which is consistent with time-varying preferences and probabilities. The preferences are expressed in the form of an empirical pricing kernel (EPK), which measures the state price per unit probability, while probabilities are derived from an...

Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse...

Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload...

This study empirically investigates the value employees place on stock options using information from the option exercise behavior of individuals. Employees hold options for another period if the value from holding them and reserving the right to exercise them later is higher than the value of...

A new options-pricing formula applies to far-out-of-the money put options on the overall stock market when disaster risk is the dominant force, the size distribution of disasters follows a power law, and the economy has a representative agent with Epstein-Zin utility. In the applicable region,...

We investigate the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in executives' decisions about when to exercise stock options. We develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the more traditional measure of risk, equity volatility. We show that...

Many business opportunities feature second-mover advantages as there are often positive spillovers and externalities from early entrants to followers. We develop a tractable stochastic duopoly entry game with a second-mover advantage. We show that firms engage in a war-of-attrition game with the...

The historical returns on equity index options are well known to be strikingly negative. That is typically explained either by investors having convex marginal utility over stock returns (e.g. crash/variance aversion) or by intermediaries demanding a premium for hedging risk. This paper examines...

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market...