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Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463704
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645
performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year … -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474534
Legal records indicate that conflicts of interest -- that is, situations in which officers and directors were in a position to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders -- were endemic to corporations in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century U.S. Yet investors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467787
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460861
Passively managed funds have grown to become some of the largest shareholders in publicly traded companies, but there is considerable debate about the effects of this growth on corporate governance. The goal of this paper is to review the literature on the governance implications of passive fund...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477210
In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunnelling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468748
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471166
This paper uses stochastic simulation and my U.S. econometric model to examine the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. Are the variances, covariances, and parameters in the model such as to favor one instrument over the other, in particular the interest rate over the money supply? The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476924
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478336