Economic variables are known to move asymmetrically over the business cycle: quickly and sharply during crises, but slowly and gradually during recoveries. Not known is the fact that this asymmetry is stronger in countries with less-developed financial systems. This new fact is documented using...

The U.S. economy has recently experienced two, seemingly unrelated, phenomena: a large increase in post-retirement life expectancy and a major expansion in securitization and shadow banking activities. We argue they are intimately related. Agents rely on financial intermediaries to save for...

Central banks provide public liquidity to traditional (regulated) banks with the intention of stabilizing the financial system. Shadow banks are not regulated, yet they indirectly access such liquidity through the interbank system. We build a model that shows how public liquidity provision may...

A financial crisis is an event of sudden information acquisition about the collateral backing short-term debt in credit markets. When investors see a financial crisis coming, however, they react by more intensively acquiring information about firms in stock markets, revealing those that are...

It depends what we want to measure. Most literature has focused on observed flow of savings (per-period savings as fraction of GDP), which has declined persistently since 1980. Even though this decline means that fewer funds are available for investment in each period, it does not follow that...

We show that aggregate volatility affects the extent to which agents can share idiosyncratic risks through the valuation of collateral. Both private and public assets are used in insurance markets as collateral, but their exposure to volatility differs. While aggregate volatility decreases the...

Using a novel data set containing all bids by all bidders for Mexican government bonds from 2001 to 2017, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key determinant of primary market bond yields. Empirically, large bidders do not pay more for bonds than the average bidder...

In absence of insurance contracts to share risk, public information is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it empowers self-insurance as agents better react to shocks, reducing risk. On the other hand, it weakens market-insurance as common knowledge of shocks restricts trading risk. We embody...

How does investors' information about a country's fundamentals, and the fact that this information may be asymmetrically held, affect a country's financing cost? Motivated by this question, and by the observation that sovereign bonds are usually auctioned in large lots to a large number of...

In fighting a financial crisis, opacity (keeping the names of banks borrowing at emergency lending facilities secret) and stigma (the cost of having a bank's name revealed) are desirable to restore confidence. Lending facilities raise the perceived average quality of all banks' assets. Opacity...