The canonical example of unprotected speech--falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre--presumes such an act inevitably causes harmful panic. This paper challenges that presumption through a game-theoretic analysis of evacuation dynamics. I model a theatre as an N * M grid where rational...

This is a paper in the ``economists ruin everything'' field. It considers whether Catch-22 situations can persist as an equilibrium phenomenon. Rather than being an arbitrary rule or a set of self-serving beliefs, the focus is on the preferences of Gatekeepers who choose to create such...

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...

This paper analyzes the design of tests to distinguish human from artificial intelligence through the lens of information design. We identify a fundamental asymmetry: while AI systems can strategically underperform to mimic human limitations, they cannot overperform beyond their capabilities....

We develop a model of strategic information provision where politicians choose how to allocate limited disclosure across multiple policy dimensions. Citizens are heterogeneous statistical learners who interpret data differently, following Liang (2021). Our key insight: spreading information...

This paper analyzes patterns of majority language acquisition in an economy consisting of a majority group and multiple minority groups. We consider contexts in which allows individuals choose among three options: full learning, partial learning, or no learning of the majority language. The key...

Immigrants in economies with a dominant native language exhibit substantial heterogeneities in language acquisition of the majority language. We model partial equilibrium language acquisition as an equilibrium phenomenon. We consider an environment where heterogeneous agents from various...

We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking...

Despite extensive use of bargaining models in economics and despite Becker's insistence on the importance of altruism in families, the theoretical literature on bargaining ignores altruism and assumes that everyone is an egoist. This paper shows that incorporating altruism into cooperative...

We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are...