observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment, but they fail to explain two important … it is detected. We propose a theory of "equilibrium price cutting and business stealing" in cartels to bridge this gap … between theory and observation …

We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement … specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a "single enforcer punishment … punishment that enforcers are willing to impose on deviators. Conversely, when the specialized enforcement technology is …

; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can … partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always … remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be …

from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive …

century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines …. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted … to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will …