This paper was prepared as a Keynote Address for the ESRC Conference on the Future of Macroeconomics held at the Bank of England Conference Center on April 14, 2000. It uses the empirical framework for formulating and estimating forward looking monetary policy rules developed in Clarida, Gali,...

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented...

This paper reviews the recent literature on monetary policy rules. We exploit the monetary policy design problem within a simple baseline theoretical framework. We then consider the implications of adding various real world complications. Among other things, we show that the optimal policy...

This paper presents some empirical results on the dynamic relationship between fiscal policy and the real exchange rate in the G3 countries since advent of floating exchange rates. This subject is of some interest given the recent shift to fiscal surpluses in the US, the annual announcement of...

We examine the factors that account for the returns on currency carry trade strategies. Using a dataset of daily returns spanning 18 years for 5 different long - short currency carry portfolios, we first document a robust empirical relationship between carry trade excess returns and exchange...

We show in a simple -- but robust -- theoretical monetary exchange rate model that the sign of the covariance between an inflation surprise and the nominal exchange rate can tell us something about how monetary policy is conducted. Specifically, we show that 'bad news' about inflation -- that it...

We study the international monetary policy design problem within an optimizing two-country sticky price model, where each country faces a short run tradeoff between output and inflation. The model is sufficiently tractable to solve analytically. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, the policy...