Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on … clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign …

insights into what determines corruption and how to design policy to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to … measure voters' willingness to pay for various commonly-proposed anti-corruption policies, such as increasing audit …In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model offers important …

enhancing political and judiciary accountability. We do so in the context of Brazil's anti-corruption program, which randomly …Political corruption is considered a major impediment to economic development, and yet it remains pervasive throughout … the world. This paper examines the extent to which government audits of public resources can reduce corruption by …

in the prevalence of corruption, and in its attempts to root out corruption. The recent anti-corruption campaign in China … understand the determinants of corruption by government officials and the causes and consequences of corruption and anti-corruption …. I summarize the key findings regarding how the anti-corruption campaign affects the behavior of a host of decisions …

We use China's recent anti-corruption campaign as a natural experiment to examine the (market expected) equilibrium … consequences of (anti-)corruption. We argue that the announcement of inspections of provincial governments by the Central … Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on May 17, 2013 represents a significant departure of past norms of anti-corruption …

changes: subsidies became significantly positively associated with future innovation after the anti-corruption campaign and …, we find that the anticorruption campaign that began in 2012 and the departures of local government officials responsible … subsidy awards and depressed the influence of their corruption-related expenditures. We also examine the impact of these …

possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …

Can campaign promises change voter behavior, even where clientelism and vote buying are pervasive? We elicit …