consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in …. Consistent with high potential costs of active bank involvement, we find that bankers tend to be represented on the boards of … implications for the current bank regulatory reform debate, such as whether to permit banks to own equity in non-financial firms …

outside directors than non- financial firms, and bank officer-directors tend to have more external board directorships than …- information cost firms are also more likely to borrow from their connected bank, and when they do so the terms of the loan appear …

(e.g. bank profits) and the incentive to maximize firm value. Requiring financial expertise on boards, as mandated by …

We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is … no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1 …) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a risk committee before the Dodd-Frank Act forced bank holding …