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Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide

González, Tanja Artiga - 2013

We study financial reporting and corporate governance in 218 companies accused of price fixing. These firms engage in evasive financial reporting strategies, including earnings smoothing, segment reclassification, and restatements. In corporate governance, cartel firms favor outside directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459775

Research in Accounting for Income Taxes

Graham, John - 2010

This paper comprehensively reviews Accounting for Income Taxes (AFIT). The first half provides background and a primer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462987

The Geography of Financial Misconduct

Parsons, Christopher A. - 2014

misconduct correspond with local waves of non-financial corruption, such as political fraud …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458320

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

Dyck, Alexander - 2007

What external control mechanisms are most effective in detecting corporate fraud? To address this question we study in … depth all reported cases of corporate fraud in companies with more than 750 million dollars in assets between 1996 and 2004 …. We find that fraud detection does not rely on one single mechanism, but on a wide range of, often improbable, actors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465774

Unethical Culture, Suspect CEOs and Corporate Misbehavior

Biggerstaff, Lee - 2013

We show that firms with CEOs who personally benefitted from options backdating were more likely to engage in other forms of corporate misbehavior, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms were more likely to overstate firm profitability and to engage in less profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459399

Trust and Cheating

Butler, Jeffrey V. - 2012

When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460152

Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging

Zitzewitz, Eric - 2012

Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460925

The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation

Crocker, Keith J. - 2006

This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016

Australian Government Balance Sheet Management

Au-Yeung, Wilson - 2006

Based on this framework, we find that a Future Fund portfolio that included (amongst other potential investments) domestic nominal securities and equities of selected countries would reduce overall balance sheet risk

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466348

Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions : Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans

Bergstresser, Daniel - 2004

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter investment decisions to justify, and capitalize on, these manipulations. We construct a measure of the sensitivity of reported earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468150