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Collective Action in an Asymmetric World

Chen, Cuicui - 2016

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456435

Bargaining Power in Marriage : Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production

Pollak, Robert A. - 2005

What determines bargaining power in marriage? This paper argues that wage rates, not earnings, determine well-being at the threat point and, hence, determine bargaining power. Observed earnings at the bargaining equilibrium may differ from earnings at the threat point because hours allocated to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467446

Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining

Simsek, Alp - 2016

political negotiations, political capital) as the extent to which a party's current bargaining power translates into its … bargaining delays, as well as the finer bargaining details in political negotiations. Optimistic players delay the agreement if … effects, by which upcoming deadlines or elections lead to ex-ante gridlock. In political negotiations, political capital is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456391

Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining

Ali, S. Nageeb - 2014

This paper examines the relationship between the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining and the predictability of the process governing the recognition of legislators. Our main result establishes that, for a broad class of legislative bargaining games, if the recognition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458653

Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework

Aizenman, Joshua - 1989

This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476029

Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics : Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Bowen, Renee - 2020

We study a dynamic bargaining model between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter's proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her "personal power". The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482201

On the Self-interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations

Lange, Andreas - 2009

We discuss self-interested uses of equity arguments in international climate negotiations. Using unique data from a … facilitate negotiations. Consistent with experimental and behavioral studies on fairness perceptions, we find that individuals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463718

Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining

Battaglini, Marco - 2019

We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479615

Persuading with Anecdotes

Haghtalab, Nika; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012510540

“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining : A Microfoundation for Applied Work

Collard-Wexler, Allan - 2014

A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458024