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An important aspect of corporate governance is the assessment of managers. When managers vary in ability, determining …? This paper begins an exploration of that issue by considering the consequence of one such bias, the base-rate fallacy, for … due to the base-rate fallacy, they can also benefit from this bias …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453935
"frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a … reporting errors. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460658
The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471166
The folk wisdom is that competition reduces agency costs. We provide indirect empirical support for this view. We argue that the temptation to retain cash and engage in less productive activities is more severe for firms in less competitive industries. Hence an unanticipated increase in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471296
shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they …, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order … to identify whether managers have private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471449
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution … of incentives and responsibilities for other members of the top management team. An extension of the standard principal … responsibility. The aggregate pay-performance sensitivity of the top management team is quite substantial, at $30.24 per thousand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
that this demographic group makes the best business managers. I suggest that this in turn is not because they are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471993
We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472852
through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473055