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We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460190
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271
We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461018
We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local … presence of regional spillover and the incentive for political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the … political competition, they allocate less government procurement contracts to firms in the competing city; second, local firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477272
In most of the literature on auctions the valuations of agents are exogenously specified. This assumption may be inappropriate in a number of cases where valuations are better derived endogenously. Endogenous valuations are appropriate when there are many units being auctioned and their value is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475544
and inventories, as the firms are more able to avoid the intense competition in low inventory states. While average bids …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455844
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463882
In the contingent valuation literature, both anchoring and acquiescence biases pose problems when using an iterative bidding game to infer willingness to pay. Anchoring bias occurs when the willingness to pay estimate is sensitive to the initially presented starting value. Acquiescence bias...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464782
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957
Open borders imply systems competition. This paper studies the implications of systems competition for the national … competition rules. It is shown that an equilibrium where all countries retain their antitrust laws does not exist, since …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471517