We study a dynamic and in nite{dimensional model with Knightian uncertainty modeled by incomplete multiple prior preferences. In in- terior e cient allocations, agents share a common risk{adjusted prior and use the same subjective interest rate. Interior e cient alloca- tions and equilibria...

In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by...

We study a dynamic and infinite–dimensional model with incomplete multiple prior preferences. In interior efficient allocations, agents share a common risk–adjusted prior and subjective interest rate. Interior efficient allocations and equilibria coincide with those of economies with...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...