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We exploit three natural experiments in Argentina in order to study the role of legislative malapportionment on the biased federal tax sharing scheme prevalent in the country. We do not find support to attribute it to legislative malapportionment during periods when democratic governments were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969273
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950960
We investigate the influence of electoral rules and voter information in elections on voting outcomes and the quality … of public officials, using new data on state court judge elections in 39 states in the U.S. from 1990 to 2010. We find …, first, that voting is very partisan in partisan judicial elections - i.e., there is a strong correlation between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951100
This paper develops a politico-economic model for use in studying the role of intra-elite conflict in the simultaneous determination of a country's political regime, trade policy and income-tax-based redistribution scheme. Three socioeconomic groups are involved: two elite groups and workers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951164
-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271399
Since a key function of competitive elections is to allow voters to express their policy preferences, one might take it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085211
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652779
We employ a regression discontinuity design based on close elections to estimate the rents from a seat in the U …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372447
We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359896