The manner in which the political system responds to external economic shocks in developing countries is a key determinant of the private investment response. We look at a simple model of political-economic equilibrium to make this intuition more precise. and develop the idea of a "political...

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. We define ?political instability? as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which political instability and...

Previous empirical studies of secondary market discounts for developing countries have ignored important creditor country factors. The empirical evidence in this paper indicates that, after controlling for repayment indicators of borrower countries, bank exposure and capital are important...

This paper investigates the impact of past defaults. and of recently acquired sovereignty on the terms of bank loans for developing countries in the 1970s. We control for countries' repayment indicators and for a measure of their political stability. Our findings are that: 1) The repayment...

This paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of domestic political incentives in the accumulation of large external debts by developing countries during 1972-81. The theoretical model characterizes two equilibrium regimes. In one regime the borrower is on its demand curve and...

In the context of a model that distinguishes between large money center banks and smaller regional banks, we show that the percentage of a country's debt held by the large banks affects the secondary market price of that country's debt: the higher the concentration of the debt, the higher the...