Showing 1 - 10 of 106
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493272
coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather … smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008634661
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533385
experiments. In this paper, we establish important bounds on these results by examining the behavior of four distinct subject … that pit professionals against preprogrammed computers, and (2) post-experiment questionnaires. The most likely explanation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614935
We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019669
vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019694
possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268
This paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect … student outcomes. We use data from the auditing of Brazil's local governments to construct objective measures of corruption … of corruption across municipalities and controlling for student, school, and municipal characteristics, we find a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950699
Andhra Pradesh, using a large-scale experiment that randomized the rollout of Smartcards over 158 sub- districts and 19 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950950