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than its static analog. We then test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036819
We study the relationship between market structure and innovation in the global automobile industry from 1982 to 2004 using the dynamic industry framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Firms optimally choose a continuous level of innovation in a strategic and forward-looking manner, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614658
We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. An agent's payoff decreases with the mismatch between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885300
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner's dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951021
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005079168
We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718537
We study the evolution of the social norm of "cooperation" in a dynamic environment. Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior that are stable in part due to agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025295
Commercial radio stations and advertisers have potentially conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This paper estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718037
We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities and prices. The … demands across the firms. We first establish the existence of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria (oligopoly equilibria … oligopoly equilibria of this game can be arbitrarily low. However, if the best oligopoly equilibrium is selected (among multiple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005575398