Showing 1 - 10 of 217
This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. I try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts. There are four kinds of games: static or dynamic, and complete or incomplete information. ( Complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779015
In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049877
identified: the government can improve welfare by manipulating the incentives agents face when deciding how to use their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580205
This paper examines equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of economies with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. In equilibrium, complementarity amplifies aggregate volatility by increasing the sensitivity of actions to public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580464
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an environment where market participants play a coordination game with information heterogeneity. We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a model where speculators observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580557
indirectly inferrable through the success or failure of projects that the leader undertakes, then the incentives of the leader … there are poor incentives and inefficiently low payoffs, even below that of simply replacing the leader in every period …. Incentives can be improved via term limits. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796728
We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. An agent's payoff decreases with the mismatch between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885300
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
Previous findings on punishment have focused on environments in which the outcomes are known with certainty. In this paper, we conduct experiments to investigate how punishment affects cooperation in a two-person stochastic prisoner's dilemma environment where each person can decide whether or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951021
We model tipping as a game-theoretic phenomenon and investigate the connection between supermodular games, tipping of equilibria and cascading, and apply the results to issues that arise in the context of homeland security and computer security. We show that tipping and cascading can occur in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248804