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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab
Lange, Andreas; Dannenberg, Astrid; Sturm, Bodo - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010
(coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of … pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full … internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the free-riding incentives by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008634661
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A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations
Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2004
Owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea (e.g., authors, security issuers, sponsors of standards) often need to persuade potential buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or idea. To this purpose, they often resort to more or less independent certifiers. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005019429
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An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory
Gibbons, Robert - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 1997
This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. I try to give simple definitions and intuitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779015
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Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications
Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049877
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Policy with Dispersed Information
Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007
This paper studies policy in a class of economies in which information about commonly-relevant fundamentals -- such as aggregate productivity and demand conditions -- is dispersed and can not be centralized by the government. In these economies, the decentralized use of information can fail to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580205
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Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information
Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2005
This paper examines equilibrium and welfare in a tractable class of economies with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and incomplete information. In equilibrium, complementarity amplifies aggregate volatility by increasing the sensitivity of actions to public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580464
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Coordination and Policy Traps
Angeletos, George-Marios; Hellwig, Christian; Pavan, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2003
This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in an environment where market participants play a coordination game with information heterogeneity. We consider defense policies against speculative currency attacks in a model where speculators observe the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580557
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Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
Jackson, Matthew O.; Aghion, Philippe - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
In this paper we analyze the problem of whether and/or when to replace a leader (agent) when no monetary rewards are available, and it is the leader's competence rather than effort that is being evaluated. The only decisions that the leader takes over time are whether to undertake risky but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796728
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Political Economy in a Changing World
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
We provide a general framework for the analysis of the dynamics of institutional change (e.g., democratization, extension of political rights or repression of different groups), and how these dynamics interact with (anticipated and unanticipated) changes in the distribution of political power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950976