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Equity overvaluation is thought to create the potential for managerial misbehavior, while monitoring and corporate governance curb misbehavior. We combine these two insights from the literatures on misvaluation and governance to ask 'when does governance matter?' Examining firms with standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950985
of takeover bids. Mergers frequently force target CEOs to retire early, and CEOs' private merger costs are the forgone … costs, we find strong evidence that target CEO preferences affect merger patterns. The likelihood of receiving a takeover … in takeover activity appears discretely at the age-65 threshold, with no gradual increase as CEOs approach retirement age …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652858
We survey the theory and evidence of behavioral corporate finance, which generally takes one of two approaches. The market timing and catering approach views managerial financing and investment decisions as rational managerial responses to securities mispricing. The managerial biases approach...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251520
We survey more than 1,000 CEOs and CFOs to understand how capital is allocated, and decision-making authority is delegated, within firms. We find that CEOs are least likely to share or delegate decision-making authority in mergers and acquisitions, relative to delegation of capital structure,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009277253
We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low "frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011227925
In an important and influential work, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a trading strategy based on an index of 24 governance provisions (G-Index) would have earned abnormal returns during the 1991-1999 period, and this intriguing finding has attracted much attention ever since it was...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631671
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631680
This paper studies the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice issued during proxy contests. We document significant abnormal stock returns around proxy vote recommendations and develop an estimation procedure for disentangling stock price effects due to changes in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040659
hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support -- boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The paper …-run, inferences from IPO charters, interests of long-term shareholders, aggregate shareholder wealth, and protection of stakeholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710800
knight, from 32% to 25%. Furthermore, we find that the shareholders of targets that remained independent were made worse off … of shareholders of hostile bid targets on the order of 8-10%. Finally, we show that most staggered boards were adopted … before the developments in takeover doctrine that made ESBs such a potent defense. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714354