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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

spiller, pablo t.; Moszoro, Marian W. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950960

Private Returns to Public Office

Fisman, Raymond; Schulz, Florian; Vig, Vikrant - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

We study the wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271399

The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

Kerr, William R.; Lincoln, William F.; Mishra, Prachi - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011

We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359896

Education and the Quality of Government

Shleifer, Andrei; Botero, Juan; Ponce, Alejandro - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

Generally speaking, better educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in both dictatorships and democracies. We suggest that a possible reason for this fact is that educated people are more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials, so that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550934

Coase v. the Coasians

Johnson, Simon; Shleifer, Andrei - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 1999

judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring … strategies may sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in … the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These episodes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718385

What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers

Gentzkow, Matthew Aaron; Shapiro, Jesse - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

We construct a new index of media slant that measures whether a news outlet.s language is more similar to that of a congressional Republican or Democrat. We apply the measure to study the market forces that determine political con- tent in the news. We estimate a model of newspaper demand that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005575725

Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality

Olken, Benjamin - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

This paper examines the accuracy of beliefs about corruption, using data from Indonesian villages. Specifically, I compare villagers%u2019 stated beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of %u2018missing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710927

Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Chassang, Sylvain; Miquel, Gerard Padró i - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Caselli, Francesco; Morelli, Massimo; Cunningham, Thomas E. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652779

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