with full commitment power, we assume that any centralized mechanism can only be operated by a self-interested ruler/government … that truth-telling mechanisms can be used despite the commitment problems and the different interests of the government …. Using this tool, we show that if the government is as patient as the agents, the best sustainable mechanism leads to an …

redistributive public good provision. As a consequence, when all public goods are provided by the central government, capital taxes …

remain obstinately blind to them, embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government. Conversely, an …

of diverse complementary industries, and suggests a role for government in providing such coordination. We argue that … Japan's zaibatsu, or pyramidal business groups, provided this coordination after the Meiji government failed at the task. We …

externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful …