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Manipulated voters in competitive election campaigns

Akoz, Kemal K?vanc; Arbatli, Cemal Eren - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2013

election campaign models that do not support information manipulation in equilibrium, our paper rationalizes misleading …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010717761

Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements

Pavlova, Natalia; Shastitko, Andrey - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2014

The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010760521

Collusion in markets characterized by one large buyer: lessons learned from an antitrust case in Russia

Shastitko, Andrei Y.; Golovanova, Svetlana V. - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2014

analysis of the materials in this case using modern economic theory indicates that the presence of collusion is inconsistent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738436

Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment

Yusupova, Gyuzel - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2013

The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720479

Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness

Makarov, Andrey V. - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2014

explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of BRICS, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania … (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098892