This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals). The proof of...

The dominating subject pool in economic experiments is undergraduate university students. Reasons for this include access and convenience to experimentors, but the representativeness of this pool has not been fully established. This paper describes one possible method for using other subject...

Heterogeneity in patient populations is an important issue in health economic evaluations, as the cost-effectiveness of an intervention can vary between patient subgroups, and an intervention which is not cost-effective in the overall population may be cost-effective in particular subgroups....

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave...

This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals’ judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information...

From a public database in Sweden we obtained a subject pool consisting of one group 20 years old and another group that was exactly 50 years older. The groups participated in a mail-based trust game. In the trust game the young cohort exhibited significantly more trust than the old cohort did....

Undergraduates in Tanzania and Sweden participated in one Trust game, one Dictator game, and answered a standard set of survey questions relating to trust. In both countries we detected a strong and significant relation between Dictator donations and proportions returned in Trust games, which...

This paper investigates trust in situations, where decision-makers are large groups and the decision-mechanism is collective, by developing a game to study trust behavior. Theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that trust in such situations may differ from individual trust....

Undergraduates in Tanzania were exposed to one Trust game, one Dictator game and a standard set of survey questions relating to trust. We demonstrate that the survey questions neither predicts trust behavior nor trustworthiness as previously claimed by Glaeser et al. (2000). It is also shown...

This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new...