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Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2002

assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and … implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645140

Cooperation with Externalities and Uncertainty

Habis, Helga; Csercsik, Dávid - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012

, hence agreements must be stable against both types of deviations. The appropriate extension of the classical core concept …, the Sustainable Core, is defined for this new setup to test the stability of allocations in such a complex environment. A … achieved by choosing an element in the Sustainable Core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734790

How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

Andersson, Tommy; Yang, Zaifu; Zhang, Dongmo - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014

and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781612

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010945031

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2015

This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266604

Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006

This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771064

Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Money

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2000

Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a compensating perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190590

Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game

Andersson, Tommy - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2004

transferable utility. First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to have a non-empty core. This is … followed by a description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419349

Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419350

Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2002

In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645112