Undergraduates in Tanzania were exposed to one Trust game, one Dictator game and a standard set of survey questions relating to trust. We demonstrate that the survey questions neither predicts trust behavior nor trustworthiness as previously claimed by Glaeser et al. (2000). It is also shown...

Using Bertrand supergames with communication, we study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets. The experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication: zero-cost, low-cost and high-cost. We find that increasing the...

Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing schemes are becoming increasingly popular in a wide range of industries. We develop a model incorporating self-image into the buyer's utility function and introduce heterogeneity in consumption utility and image-sensitivity, which generates different purchase...

This paper compares the choice of focal points in a Nash Demand Game embedded in an abstract frame with the corresponding choices in a game with a real product frame where parties bargain for a well-known consumer product. We find that the frame has a substantial impact on the fraction of...

We study risk taking on behalf of others, both with and without potential losses. A large-scale incentivized experiment is conducted with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population. On average, decision makers take the same risks for other people as for themselves when losses are...

Are people strategically ignorant of the negative externalities their activities cause the environment? Herein we examine if people avoid costless information on those externalities and use ignorance as an excuse to reduce pro-environmental behavior. We develop a theoretical framework in which...

We conduct an incentivized experiment to test whether the willingness to pay is higher for debit cards compared to cash for three consumer products. Our findings support this conjecture also after controlling for cash availability, spending type, price familiarity and consumption habits of the...

We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future...