This paper studies the probability of filling a vacancy, how it varies with the number of unemployed and number of vacancies in the local labor market, and what impact it has on employment. A greater availability of unemployed workers should make it easier for a firm to fill a vacancy but more...

We formulate an efficiency wage model with on-the-job search where wages depend on turnover and employers may use information on whether the searching worker is employed or unemployed as a hiring criterion. We show theoretically that ranking by employment status affects both the level and the...

This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with...

”Svensk arbetsmarknad tycks trotsa tyngdlagen.” Så uttalade sig finansminister Anders Borg i början av juli 2010. Han pekade på att det dramatiska fallet i BNP i finanskrisens spår inte hade åtföljts av någon dramatisk minskning av sysselsättningen. I denna uppsats ges en...

Conventional measures of unemployment do not capture all dimensions of joblessness. A case in point is underemployment among employed workers, also frequently referred to as parttime unemployment. Workers in this category are employed during a survey week but are unable to work as many hours as...

We estimate the effects of conditioning benefits on program participation among older long-term unemployed workers. We exploit a Swedish reform which reduced UI duration from 90 to 60 weeks for a group of older unemployed workers in a setting where workers who ex-hausted their benefits received...

Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding...

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...

One goal of the public employment service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job seekers to vacancies is one...

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of...