We model self-control conflict as a stochastic struggle of an agent against a visceral influence, which impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the...

The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract...

We use a natural field experiment to investigate the hypothesis that generosity is partly involuntary, by examining whether individuals tend to avoid opportunities to act generously. In Sweden, new recycling machines for bottles and cans with an option of donating the returned deposit to charity...

When facing the opportunity to allocate resources between oneself and others, individuals may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and preferences to act pro-socially. We explore the domain of conditional cooperation, and we test the hypothesis that increased...

We test the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between short-term temptation to be selfish and better judgment to act pro-socially. Using a dictator game and a public goods game, we manipulated the likelihood that individuals identified self-control conflict, and...

In this paper we assume that choice of commodities at the individual (household) level is made in the budget set and that the choice can be described by a probability density function. We prove that negativity (()0xExp<) is valid for one(x) or two choice variables (x, y) (No Giffen good).Negativity at the market level is valid by summation. The expected demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. We use general positive continuous functions f(x), f(x, y) defined on the bounded budget set. We transform them into probability density functions to calculate E(x) and prove negativity. The present approach use simple assumptions and is descriptive in its nature. Any choice behaviour that can be described by a continuous density function gives the above results. (,,)xyppm Why not keep descriptions as simple as possible?<p>

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of individual resource endowments for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation. Drawing on new data for more than 27 000 respondents in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest surprisingly...

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors underlying the gender gap in African electoral and inter-electoral political participation. Drawing on new data covering over 27,000 respondents from 246 regions in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest that while there is...

This paper seeks to explain within as well as between country variation in preferences for redistribution in terms of self interest concerns, and an input based concept of fairness captured by the effects of beliefs about the causes of income differences. Results of estimations based on data for...