This paper considers the relationship between fines for cartels and generalised harm or corporate benefit, showing that the deterrent effect of fines is based on their relationship to corporate benefit. It also considers how knowing the amount of harm or corporate benefit can help to ensure...

This paper was prepared as a background note for a discussion held at the OECD in October 2015 on Cartels Involving Intermediate Goods. It discusses the specific nature of cartels in intermediate goods and to examine the bearing this may have on their functioning and detection. The paper also...

This paper discusses some of the complementarities and trade-offs that the fight against collusion and corruption present to policy makers. It illustrates with examples from Latin America. It was prepared as background material for the session "Improving Effective Public Procurement: Fighting...

Competition authorities have developed various tools to detect cartels and substantiate the basis for opening investigations. Ex officio investigations, meaning investigations initiated by the authorities themselves, are derived from detection tools that require a higher level of proactivity...

The OECD Competition Committee debated oligopolies in 1999. This document includes an executive summary, an analytical note by the OECD and submissions from Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,...

In recent years the scope for near perfect price discrimination, particularly in the digital economy, appears to have grown. This raises a question over how those jurisdictions in which exploitative price discrimination is an offence will respond. In contrast, the risk of price discrimination...

This paper explores excessive prices at the intersection between competition law and regulated sectors such as pharma. It was prepared as a background note for the OECD Competition Committee roundtable on “Excessive pricing in pharmaceuticals”, which took place in November 2018.