This paper discusses criteria used when setting fines and how these criteria relate to the ultimate goals of deterring and punishing competition law offences. It was prepared as background material for the session "Criteria for Setting Fines for Competition Law Infringements" held at the 2013...

This paper provides an overview of different methodologies regarding corporate fines, including recent developments, used to calculate fines for infractions of competition law as well as the various elements that are taken into consideration when determining the appropriate fine level. It was...

This report compares Australia's pecuniary sanctions regime for competition law infringements to that of a number of other major OECD jurisdictions, including larger ones, such as the EU and the US, as well as smaller jurisdictions with advanced competition law regimes, such as Germany, Japan,...

This paper considers the relationship between fines for cartels and generalised harm or corporate benefit, showing that the deterrent effect of fines is based on their relationship to corporate benefit. It also considers how knowing the amount of harm or corporate benefit can help to ensure...

This paper was prepared as background for a discussion held at the OECD in June 2016 on commitment decisions in antitrust cases. It reviews arguments in favour and against the use of commitment decisions as they are presented in the literature. It also discusses judicial reviews of commitment...

The OECD Competition Committee debated loyalty and fidelity discounts and rebates in June 2002. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: an analytical note by Mr. Gary Hewitt for the OECD, written submissions from Australia, Brazil, Finland, the European...

Keeping a good disciplinary climate is a key to student learning and well-being. Disciplinary norms need to be clearly established and applied fairly and consistently. Yet, strictness alone cannot optimise student outcomes: students need support and understanding.