We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are defined over streams of physical outcomes. This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra and...

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to...

We characterize measures of school segregation for any number of ethnic groups using a set of purely ordinal axioms that includes Scale Invariance: a school district's segregation ranking should be invariant to changes that do not affect the distribution of ethnic groups across schools. The...

We examine the problem of measuring influence based on the information contained in the data on the communications between scholarly publications, judicial decisions, patents, web pages, and other entities. The measurement of influence is useful to address several empirical questions such as...

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is...

This paper analyzes symmetric, single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently and identically distributed, buyers are indifferent...

We propose two generalizations of the Davis-Maschler reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

We propose a set of axioms for the measurement of multigroup school segregation. They are motivated by two criteria: do ethnic groups have similar distributions across schools? And are schools ethnically representative of their district? Our axioms are satisfied by a unique ordering. It is...

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in the complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are...

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the gender wage gap. The difference in earnings is a consequence of a demographic regularity --- that men tend to marry younger women --- which limits women's labor mobility. However, couples are always free not to marry, and do so only if it is...