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Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775628
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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games.
Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996
The paper discusses several topics such Nash equilibria, repeated games. It also discusses applications to market games, regulation and R&D games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775632
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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations.
Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996
We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618870