We model the trading possibilities of one seller and n potential buyers as a strategic game, which extends the two-person sealed-bid double auction. We introduce particular communication equilibria for this game, the self-fulfilling equilibria. In the case of arbitrary informational...

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...

In a 2-person Nash equilibrium any pure strategy is evaluated against the same mixed strategy of the opponent. The equilibrium condition says that all pure strategies used at equilibrium are best replies, hence they give the same payoff. We keep here the last two requirements (best reply and...

This note clarifies some aspects of Berheim's (1986) characterization of Nash and correlated equilibria.