Showing 1 - 7 of 7
In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109007
In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110067
In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110371
In this paper, a stochastic endogenous aggregative growth model is constructed and two main results are established, based on endogenous horizon of the economy and endogenous terminal capital stock, which is also efficient capital accumulation in some sense. First, strong turnpike theorems under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260194
In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107798
In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108983
In the paper, we re-investigate the long run behavior of an adaptive learning process driven by the stochastic replicator dynamics developed by Fudenberg and Harris (1992). It is demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium will be the robust limit of the adaptive learning process as long as it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259695