We analyze an endogenous prize all-pay auction under complete information where it is possible that none of the bidders wins and the winning payoff becomes non-monotonic in own bid. We derive the conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the unique mixed...

We compare the random preference, Fechner, and constant error (or "tremble") approaches to the stochastic modelling of choice under risk. Various combinations of these approaches are used with expected utility and rank-dependent theory to generate a set of econometric models. These are estimated...

This paper presents a methodology to study the identification of the content of focal points (Schelling 1960). This question is important for external validity and operationalising theories of decision making (e.g. team-reasoning and level-k). Choices implied by different concepts are mapped...

Recent papers hypothesize that an asymmetry in regret motivates aggressive bidding in laboratory first-price auctions. Subjects emphasize potential earnings foregone from being outbid. Proposed motivators of this asymmetry include the one-to-one relationship in the auction between winning and...

We explore network effects on generosity for different network dimensions. To this end we elicit multiple network dimensions (friendship, social support, economic exchange, etc.) in a rural village in the Southern hemisphere and measure generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in...