possible in some cases. However, once consumer learning is introduced, the monopoly outcome first found by Diamond (1971) is …

We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We …

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic … situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning … in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close …

games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects … equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We …

This paper applies recent advances in the theory of learning to the analysis of consumer behaviour in a dynamic duopoly … constrast is made between belief-based and reinforcement/familiarity-based learning. In the latter case, consumers can be locked … steady states in which one firm dominates. In contrast, belief-based learning rules must lead asymptotically to correct …

possible in some cases. However, once consumer learning is introduced, the monopoly outcome first found by Diamond (1971) is …

). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given. …

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP … equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …