Dynamic principal-agent settings with asymmetric information but no commitment are well known to create a ratchet effect. Here, the most efficient agents must be provided with extra 'information rent' as an incentive to relinquish their informational advantage over an uninformed principal; this...

We consider two aspects of the commitment problem in price regulation with lobbying the ratchet effect and the hold-up problem. We set out a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where the regulated firm can ‘buy influence’ in a lobbying equilibrium. Firms can sink...

We consider a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where strategic delegation is available to the regulator. Firms can sink non-contractible, cost-reducing investment but regulators cannot commit to future price levels. We fully characterise the perfect Bayesian...

Administered Incentive Pricing (AIP) of radio spectrum as advocated by Smith/NERA (1996) and recently assessed by Indepen (2003) envisages an incremental path towards e±cient pricing, with revealed and stated prefer- ence methods being used to reveal opportunity costs. We build on the latter to...

We investigate the potential economic effects of spectrum trading amongst firms who require spectrum licences as part of their activities. Trading takes place within the technical interference constraints enforced by a regulator. The model accommodates a variety of markets and firms, as well as...

Treating spectrum of different bandwidths as essentially distinct inputs needed for possibly different types of services has formed the core of spectrum analysis in academic research so far. New technological advances, such as cognitive radio, now allow us to move away from this inflexibility...

For the first time, we test for effects of liability on hospital care using measures of current perceptions of litigation risk at hospital level; in particular, the risk-sharing arrangements agreed between hospitals and their insurers. GMM and ML estimators are used to allow for possible...

Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. Other papers have produced evidence consistent with the presence of such favouritism but have been unable to consider methods for controlling it. We address this issue in the context of a natural...

This paper combines models and ideas from radio-engineering literature and economics to address the need for regulation of spectrum allocation in a commons scenario. It discusses under what conditions a laissez-faire policy towards spectrum usage would engender the inefficiencies of a spectrum...

For the first time, we present evidence on employee theft in the UK using data on actual recorded crime. We present a model where employees are rational cheaters with consciences to produce hypotheses about the role of labour market (wages, unemployment) and social (age, education) influences on...