In order to protect themselves against the potential losses in case of a participant’s default and to contain systemic risk, central counterparties (CCPs) need to maintain sufficient financial resources. Typically, these financial resources consist of margin requirements and contributions to a...

In order to protect themselves against the potential losses in case of a participant's default and to contain systemic risk, central counterparties (CCPs) need to maintain sufficient financial resources. Typically, these financial resources consist of margin requirements and contributions to a...

In this working paper, we study the three generic clearing arrangements in the presence of two-sided limited commitment: simple bilateral clearing, segregated collateral clearing through a third party, and - most sophisticated of all - central counterparty (CCP) clearing. Clearing secures the...

In reaction to recent requests for interoperability between central counterparties of European stock markets, regulators have issued new guidelines to contain systemic risk. Our analysis confirms that the currently applied cross-CCP risk management model can be a source of contagion,...

Based on real-time trade data from the Swiss franc overnight interbank repo market and SIX Interbank Clearing (SIC) – the Swiss real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system – we are able to gain valuable insights on the daytime value of money and its determinants: First, an implicit hourly...

Building an unbalanced panel of United States (US) bank holding company (BHC) and commercial bank balance sheet data from 1986 to 2006, we examine the relationship between short-term capital buffer and portfolio risk adjustments. Our estimations indicate that the relationship over the sample...

This paper shows that transparency in banking can be harmful from a social planner’s point of view. According to our model, enhancing transparency above a certain level may lead to the inefficient liquidation of a bank. The reason lies in the nature of a standard deposit contract: its payoff...

We examine how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones, ecause borrowers may exogenously...

This paper examines the impact of credit reporting on the repayment behavior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable. We then compare market outcome with a public credit registry to that without a credit registry. This...

We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability...