Zielvereinbarungssysteme sind das wichtigste Führungsinstrument überhaupt. Systematisch praktiziert, ist die Steuerung des Mitarbeiterverhaltens über Ziele in jeder Organisation - unabhängig von Gröe︢ und Branche - ein zentraler Erfolgsfaktor. In der vorliegenden zweiten Auflage wurden...

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This paper contributes to a better understanding of behavior in agency situations. In particular, we provide experimental evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...