This paper analyses collusion by innovative firms and the role of patents in a continuous-time real options framework. A patent-investment race model is formulated in which innovative firms bargain and reach collusive agreements. It is shown that, while collusion always delays innovation, it...

Risk aversion is one of the most commonly cited properties of human decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This finding is at odds with traditional expected value theory, but not with more recent theories of rational choice (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Since Bernoulli?s...

Game theoretic studies of market equilibria are usually noncooperative, but every exchange is a cooperative interaction, so this approach is unavoidably incomplete. One mixed cooperative-noncooperative approach that allows for this is the "biform game" approach, in which agents choose...

We consider scheduling in distributed systems from a game theoretic point view while taking into account queuing theory methodologies. In this approach no one knows the global state of the system while users try to maximize their utility. Since the performance of such a blind scheduler is worse...