In this study, we ask whether the presence of precautionary savings substantially reduces the optimal replacement rate in an economy characterized by equilibrium unemployment and moral hazard. In line with previous studies, the optimality criterion based on comparisons of steady states leads to...

For typical parametrizations of the standard Holmstrom (1979) agency model, this paper demonstrates that the set of first-order conditions characterizing the optimal contract can be reduced to a single equation. A problem of investment financing under moral hazard is used to illustrate the...

The European Environmental Agency (EEA) assigns periodically air pollution emission rights among the EC member states, who, in turn, share their respective endowment among the polluting firms. There exists a moral hazard problem since the EEA does not observe abatement efforts. We propose a...

We study computational aspects of moral-hazard problems. We consider deterministic contracts as well as contracts with action and/or compensation lotteries, and formulate each case as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We investigate and compare solution properties of...

We propose a computational model to study (the evolution of) post--secondary education. "Consumers" who differ in quality shop around for desirable colleges or universities that also differ in quality. We study the dynamics and asymptotics for three nested variants of this matching model: the...