Showing 1 - 10 of 24
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706824
The framework of a general equilibrium heterogeneous agents model is used to study the optimal design of an unemployment insurance scheme and the voting behaviour on unemployment policy reforms. Agents, who have a limited lifetime and participate in the labour market until they reach the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345051
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345268
In this paper a variety of computational optimal control techniques are compared on a complicated nonlinear discrete-time model. We use a labor market model with the objective of trying to obtain an unemployment rate objective, using an active labor market program as a control. In reality the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345325
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345431
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345660
This paper sets out first, to quantify the stabilization gains from commitment in terms of household welfare and second …, to examine how commitment to an optimal or approximately optimal rule can be sustained as an equilibrium in which … commitment -- as much as a $5-6\%$ permanent increase in consumption. We also find that a simple optimized commitment rule with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537384
I ask whether differences in labor market performance between the US and Europe can be attributed to an interaction between employment protection legislation (EPL) and an acceleration in the rate of capital-embodied technical change associated with the advent of information technologies. I find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537610
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537663
This paper considers a dynamic matching model with imperfectly observable worker effort as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1994). In our economy the no-shirking condition endogenously imposes real wage rigidity on the matching market. This generates "contractual fragility" and inefficient separations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005706170