The literature on private information as a source of trade is probably most well known via the seminal work by Jean Tirole and Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey. We consider an arbitrage opportunity to be the result of the existence of such private information. We are interested to propose a model...

Within the context of an agent-based model, model selection by the economic agents is introduced and investigated. To achieve this, a specific agent, the “economic research instituteâ€, is set up and produces regular forecasts of the economy which are published to the economic agents....

We provide analytical and empirical underpinnings for the notion that the financial fragility of the aggregate economy depends on the balance sheet conditions of the corporate sector. First, we obtain time-varying semiparametric estimates of the relationship between the debt-equity ratio and the...

We study optimal incentive contracts in a continuous time principal-agent setting with hidden actions. The agent, whose effort controls the output, has a concave utility function which is non-separable in wealth and monetary cost of effort. The principal is risk neutral and optimally selects the...

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with production, in which a representative agent chooses an unobservable effort level. We cast the problem as a continuous time principal agent model. We study the problem of a central planner (the principal) choosing optimal allocations of...

For typical parametrizations of the standard Holmstrom (1979) agency model, this paper demonstrates that the set of first-order conditions characterizing the optimal contract can be reduced to a single equation. A problem of investment financing under moral hazard is used to illustrate the...

The European Environmental Agency (EEA) assigns periodically air pollution emission rights among the EC member states, who, in turn, share their respective endowment among the polluting firms. There exists a moral hazard problem since the EEA does not observe abatement efforts. We propose a...

We present a flexible model of monopoly nonlinear pricing with endogenous participation decisions of heterogeneous consumers. We use computing intensive methods to fit the solution of this model to many nonlinear tariffs offered by incumbent monopolists in several early local U.S. cellular...

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...