In a dynamic asset pricing model informed traders receive a noisy signal of the value of a risky asset while uninformed traders learn to extract the information from the price. The relative popularity of the two strategies depends on past performance. An "intensity of choice" parameter is...

\tTraders in this model of an asset market have the opportunity to conduct individual research to acquire a noisy signal of a security's future value, or they can employ least-squares learning in an attempt at extracting the private information of other traders through observing the price. For a...

When one constructs long-term investment plan, one needs to consider the fact that long-term bonds are still exposed to inflation risk. This paper studies the intertemporal portfolio-consumption decision where the investment opportunities include "inflation-indexed bonds" -- a modern financial...

The research on financial engineering by means of genetic programming is gradually popular and appealing. For example, Kaboudan (1999, 2001) and Iba and Sasaki (1999), Iba and Sasaki (1999), used standard GP to evolve forecasting models. Neely, et al. (1997), Allen and Karjalainen (1999), Fyfe...

Within the context of an agent-based model, model selection by the economic agents is introduced and investigated. To achieve this, a specific agent, the “economic research instituteâ€, is set up and produces regular forecasts of the economy which are published to the economic agents....

We provide analytical and empirical underpinnings for the notion that the financial fragility of the aggregate economy depends on the balance sheet conditions of the corporate sector. First, we obtain time-varying semiparametric estimates of the relationship between the debt-equity ratio and the...

We study optimal incentive contracts in a continuous time principal-agent setting with hidden actions. The agent, whose effort controls the output, has a concave utility function which is non-separable in wealth and monetary cost of effort. The principal is risk neutral and optimally selects the...

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model with production, in which a representative agent chooses an unobservable effort level. We cast the problem as a continuous time principal agent model. We study the problem of a central planner (the principal) choosing optimal allocations of...

For typical parametrizations of the standard Holmstrom (1979) agency model, this paper demonstrates that the set of first-order conditions characterizing the optimal contract can be reduced to a single equation. A problem of investment financing under moral hazard is used to illustrate the...