In this paper it is argued that whether cooperation is established in a prisoner's dilemma-like situation is determined by cognitive learning processes. To prove this claim a simulation model is build. This model is based on knowledge about the cognitive learning process that has been gained in...

A well known problem in economics is to describe properly a situation where N agents are repeatedly competing to use the same limited resource. A version of this problem is known in the literature as the El Farol game: week after week N agents face the decision whether to go or not to go to a...

A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating or supressing links. We model this situation with an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Each agent plays with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff...

This paper studies algorithms for equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). We present a generalization of Scholtes’s regularization scheme for MPECs and extend his convergence results to this new relaxation method. We propose a sequential nonlinear complementarity (SNCP)...

We deal with new product preannouncements in markets where customer preferences are unknown and highly unstable, as would be the case with disruptive product innovations. Our analysis is focused on the tradeoff between the firms incentive to influence consumer preferences via preannouncements...

We analyze how strategic asset trading can be used to gain competitive advantage. In the case of electricity markets, companies seek to improve the value of their generating portfolios by acquiring, or selling, power plants. Accordingly, we derive the basic determinants of plant value,...

We examine the choice between internal or external provision of information technology (“ITâ€) services for US credit unions. Credit unions may provide their own systems for tracking loans and deposit accounts or they may choose to outsource these systems from external providers....

We develop a powerful and user-friendly program for numerically solving first price auction problems where an arbitrary number of bidders draw independent valuations from heterogenous distributions and the auctioneer imposes a reserve price for the object. The heterogeneity in this model arises...

In this paper we study a local version of the Minority Game where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about beingin the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in...